Supreme Court Interpretation of the Establishment Clause Writing and the First Amendment of the Establishment Clause

 
Before 1971, there was minimal debate concerning the separation of church and state. However, as the American citizenry continued to evolve and experience increased diversity, the need to interpret and revisit the existing American laws and practices became paramount. As a result, the Supreme Court intervened to interpret the clause of the establishment (Nelson et al., 2017). The above clause in the first amendment shows that the American constitution requires the state to be separate from the church.

Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson had varied reasons to believe that mixing the church with the state was improper. In addition, Jefferson and Madison, both from Virginia, shared the opinion that the government should not support any religion or compel citizens to support religions and faiths they do not subscribe to through taxes (Pfeffer, 2018). Most religious groups felt that the establishment clause and its amendment would not adequately assure Americans of their civil and religious rights. To counter this fear, Madison proposed a modification of the establishment clause to allow citizens the freedom to engage in spiritual practices such as thanksgiving and fasting (Eberle, 2016). On the other hand, Jefferson promoted the widespread of religion by signing a treaty that allowed religious leaders to proclaim their faith even to the Native Americans freely. The amendments carried out by Jefferson and Madison form the basis for other modifications taking place since 1971 to date by courtesy of the Supreme Courts over time.

Debate on Helping Religious Institutions with Public Funding
For many years, whether religious schools should receive public funding has been up for debate. Even before finding the solution to the above discussion, some states have devised several funding plans, including tax credits and vouchers, which allow religious schools to access public funding (Strauss, 2020). Those supporting the debate argue that the prohibition of public funding by religious schools amounts to discrimination. On the other hand, those opposing argue that allowing religious schools to access public financing contravenes the establishment clause, which advocates for the separation of the church and the state.

Current Supreme Court Reversing Past Rulings
Therefore, since the inception of the clause and its first amendment, schools privately owned by various religions in America have been cut out in government funding and tax incentive programs. However, in June 2020, Supreme Court Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. constitutionalized the Montana tax benefits program for religion-affiliated schools in the Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue case law (Strauss, 2020). In support of his ruling, the chief justice affirmed that it has been improper for Supreme Court to deny schools for religious education the tax benefit program that helps such institutions enjoy public funding. The case law mentioned above was a landmark ruling as it deconstructed the past doctrines in the establishment clause advocating for the separation of church and state.

Although Jefferson advocated for a wall to separate government and the church to avoid conflicts between the two institutions, the current Supreme Court finds the establishment clause contains some outdated and irrelevant doctrines to the current American generation. For instance, the existing supreme courts continue to strengthen ties between religious institutions in public funding matters by constitutionalizing the flow of public funds into religious institutions. In Trinity Lutheran v. Comer, which took place about four years ago, the court stated that the free-exercise clause in the constitution provides some circumstances under which a government may be obliged to assist religious institutions and their practices financially (Millhiser, 2020). This statement portrayed a complete reversal of the court’s decision in Locke v. Davey in 2004 (Strauss, 2020). The majority opinion supported that it was right for theology college students to be excluded from receiving scholarships.